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	Human aging has not drawn much philosophical attention in the past. This is true not only of philosophy but also of other ways of reflecting human life. When the famous theologian Karl Rahner (1980) was in his late seventies, he wondered what theology said about aging. He could conclude only that it dealt with the subject neither explicitly nor in any great detail. The question arises why so much thought has been given to death in philosophy and so little to aging, as can be seen in any handbook or encyclopedia of philosophy. The reason for this may be that when only a few people in a society reach “old age” and death is a threat at all ages, death will attract more attention than aging. In the work of the eminent philosophers of the past we find references to aging only in the margins of their work. Plato, for instance, introduces the old Cephalus in his Republic (trans. 1941) but grants him only a short presence, as if to demonstrate that an advanced age is hardly relevant in discussing what “justice” might be. For Plato and in Greek philosophy as a whole, such matters are decided only by argument--or so they thought--and age has no role to play. When older people are considered wise in Greek philosophy, this is because they have devoted a long life to study and thought, not because of their age. It’s hard to find a more negative account of “The Character of the Old” than in Aristotle’s Rhetoric (trans. 1991), although he may occasionally make a more positive remark about aging. More interesting--but still scarce--interpretations of aging are found outside Greek philosophy, for instance, in tragedies such as Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus (Cole, 1988). Because Roman philosophy is more practically oriented, we can find more relevant work here: Cicero’s Cato Maior De Senectute (On Old Age, trans. 1988) is a well-known example, but still an exception. Essays such as Seneca’s De Brevitate Vitae (On the Shortness of Life, trans. 2007) can be applied to aging but are meant as a more general reflection about the “Art of Life” (Hadot, 1995).
The sixteenth-century philosopher Montaigne (1993) wrote “On the length of life” in his Essays: “Dying of old age is a rare death, unique and out of the normal order and therefore, less natural than the others…we should consider whatever age we have reached as an age reached by few.” Contemporary studies in historical demography show that until the earlier decades of the twentieth century there was a much greater spread of mortality over the various age categories than is currently the case in the rich countries (Imhoff, 1986). Therefore, in many respects death was much closer to people of all ages. Although the part of life that is nowadays studied and organized as “aging” can be much longer than “normal” adulthood, reflection about the possible meanings of aging has lagged behind. In trying to find answers, there has also been a renewed interest in what, however fragmented, important thinkers of the past had to say about aging (McKee, 1982; Manheimer, 2000).
In this chapter I will present another approach, as the traditions of philosophical thought have even more to offer when there is no explicit discussion of aging, but rather of themes or concepts that are crucial for our understanding of it. In this way, I have built on a long tradition of philosophical discussion of concepts of time to develop a critical approach to theories of aging (Baars, 1997b, 2007a, 2007b). In Part I of this chapter, I will argue that contemporary approaches to aging, predominant in scientific research, bureaucratic policy, planning, and even everyday discourse, presuppose a limited understanding of time: chronological time. The application of this concept of time may have some practical advantages but runs into serious problems in understanding aging processes. This diagnosis leads in Part II to another understanding of aging as living in time, where other concepts of time that have been articulated in the philosophical tradition are used to advance the understanding of aging. The first is a concept of time that aims at the interconnectedness of the present, the past, and the future. The second is the concept of the “right time,” or kairos. The third is the concept of human time as articulated in narratives. In Part III the discussion of aging as living in time is continued in a reinterpretation of finitude. One of the main problems in relation to aging is the tendency to identify finitude with death or mortality. This tendency can be understood in the light of the opening paragraph, but it restricts the understanding of aging as a process of living through situations that are all finite. In this context, aging is understood as irreversibly living through unique situations with unique people, testifying at once to the vulnerability and the preciousness of living in time.

Aging as a Dialectic of Loss and Gain
Aging is part of life, and therefore interpretations of aging are as old as thinking about human life. Since the beginning of Greek thought, for instance, in seventh-century BC lyric poetry, we find that experiences of aging lead to reflections and interpretations in which we can recognize contemporary concerns. A major theme is the decline and loss of all human qualities, lamented, for example, by Mimnermus of Smyrna in his image of an old man: “sunlight gives him joy no more. He is abhorred by boys, by women scorned: so hard a thing God made old age to be” (in West, 1993, p. 28). This theme is counterpointed by an equally important theme in Greek writing: the acquisition of a more profound understanding of “reality” through aging. Mimnermus was criticized for his restricted view of aging by Solon of Athens, who emphasized the possibilities for a continuing development through the subsequent seven-year seasons of life (Lewis, 2006).
These themes of human loss and gain can still be recognized in the interpretations philosophers have given of aging in the margins of their work. In his contribution to an earlier edition of this book, Manheimer (2000) presented an overview of the basic answers of philosophers to the processes of aging as progressive changes in the bodily, personal, and social dimensions of human life. He distinguished (1) Plato’s view of a “transformed outlook and unique contributive role” from (2) the Aristotelian view of withdrawal from society and resignation and (3) Cicero’s plea for active involvement while striving against decrements and losses associated with aging. Manheimer added the contemporary perspective (4) of postmodern deconstruction asserting that attitudes about aging would be nothing more than “culturally imposed narratives”--“a master plot of decline” (Gullette, 1997). 
To this list we can add (5) recent technocratic “antiaging” programs (De Grey, 2004; More, 2005; De Grey and Rae, 2007) that present themselves as the spearhead of fundamental scientific research but may, besides pursuing more mundane goals, also be seen as contemporary representatives of old magical traditions (Olshansky, Hayflick, and Carnes, 2002; Hall, 2003; Kass, 2003; Mehlmann et al., 2004; Post and Binstock, 2004). These programs are an interesting illustration of the thesis developed by Adorno and Horkheimer in their Dialectic of Enlightenment (1972). According to them, the relation to nature has been dominated by a desire to control nature from early on in history, as early as the period of magic and myth. This desire is caused by the fear of being submerged in nature and being swallowed by it. Although this fundamental historical trauma may not dominate rational or scientific efforts per se, megalomaniacal rationalistic ideas--such as “ending aging”--have often surfaced and are, according to Adorno and Horkheimer, the driving force behind the development of an ever more technically advanced control of nature. One of the fundamental paradoxes of this relationship to nature, however, is that the rational subject who wants to control nature completely remains nevertheless a part of this same nature and consequently gets confused and caught in his own actions. This results in the “Dialectic of Enlightenment,” a regression from the “most advanced” forms of rationalistic Enlightenment to the “most primitive” forms of magic and myth: a fountain of youth.
As long as the aging process remains uncontrollable, the striving for complete technological control is continually confronted with mankind’s shortcomings, which explains why those who are reminders of this tragic failure tend to be excluded. It comes as no surprise that a society focused on being young, dynamic, and “in control” is at a loss where aging is concerned. Here we can notice two extremes: on the one hand, the perfectly insured life of the happy pensioner, with its appealing images of staying young and being a care-free consumer (Gilleard and Higgs, 2000)--an almost magical image to ward off the uncertainties of life; on the other hand, the haunting prospect of dementia, presented by the media as a terrifying generalization of aging, in which the rational subject is lost without redemption (Robertson, 1991). These two extremes are the culmination of fears caused by the insecurities of future life in which an uncertain future of aging is not looked in the eye, but subjected to positive and negative stylization. The different dimensions of human aging are not seen as interrelated but are divided into an abstract positive and negative image of aging. The likely outcome is that negative aspects of aging will be denied the dignity and careful attention they deserve, even though these aspects are inherent in human lives (Overall, 2003). This fundamental dialectic of decline and growth, noticed since Solon in Greek thought but with even longer roots in Egyptian, Jewish, and Babylonian traditions of wisdom (Assmann, 1991, 1994), has profound implications for our understanding of aging (Burrow, 1986; Sears, 1986; Cole, 1988, 1992). I will return to this dialectic in my discussion of finitude in Part III.

Part I. A Philosophical Questioning of Basic Categories of Age and Aging
One of the main paradoxes we are confronted with is that all human beings are constantly aging, but at a certain moment in life one is labeled aged or older (older than whom?) and life beyond that point is labeled aging. The expressions aged and aging are without any justification understood as references to a special and abnormal group, although these expressions indicate a universal and continuous process of living in time. Individuals are transformed into an “aging,” “aged,” or “older” body at a particular chronological age without any evidence that important changes are taking place at that age, apart from this sudden cultural relocation. This relocation into the category of the “aged” or “older” may take place at the age of 40 years when the stigma of the “older worker” begins to hit, especially for one who has become unemployed (Hardy, 2006). In the same fashion, gerontological studies usually begin by defining their population in terms of chronological age and present their results in diagrams where the interrelation of the two axes is supposed to show that changes in certain characteristics are a function of “age.” Such visualizations presuppose that “aging” processes can be clearly and unequivocally related to chronological age, although what are presented are mostly unexplained data and possible connections.

Mistaken Associations: Time Working as a Regular Cause
Generalizations about people with a certain calendar age presuppose a causal concept of time: because time has worked for a certain duration in aging people, certain inevitable effects should be reckoned with. Moreover, the effects are assumed to develop steadily and universally according to the rhythm of the clock. However, such a causal concept of time can never generate knowledge that might explain something of the obvious differences that exist between human beings of the same age. While it is true that all causal relations are also temporal relations, or relations working “in time,” it would be wrong to identify causality with time or to reduce the process of aging to the “causal effects” of time. 
But the grand ambition of gerontology still seems to be to establish how this chronological or calendar age of individuals determines the characteristics of aging people or even of all humans. This would eventually reduce gerontology to a straightforward set of simple formulas in which scientific precision and practical use would be united. In the early days of gerontology this option was stated with much self-assurance: “Chronological age is one of the most useful single items of information about an individual if not the most useful. From this knowledge alone an amazingly large number of general statements or predictions can be made about his anatomy, physiology, psychology and social behavior” (Birren, 1959, p. 8). And yet, the author of this statement has later dealt with time extensively and has expressed serious reservations about such claims: “By itself, the collection of large amounts of data showing relationships with chronological age does not help, because chronological age is not the cause of anything. Chronological age is only an index, and unrelated sets of data show correlations with chronological age that have no intrinsic or causal relationship with each other” (Birren, 1999, p. 460). Nevertheless, explicit analysis of concepts of time that are inevitably used in the study of aging has been scarce, although there have been some notable exceptions (cf. Baars and Visser, 2007). Interestingly, the most recent edition of the Handbook of Aging and the Social Sciences (Binstock and George, 2006) opens with a section devoted to “Aging and Time,” but already in the title of the second article, “Modeling the Effects of Time” (Alwin, Hofer, and McCammon, 2006), we can see how causality and time are still unjustifiably connected and distort the analysis of aging and time.
A more intrinsic measure of aging, at least from a biological perspective, would require establishing clear indicators of “normal” functioning. If we follow biological reliability theory (Gavrilov and Gavrilova, 2006) and define aging as an increasing risk of failure with the passage of time, the question remains in what way the statistical notion of increasing risk might contribute to an understanding of aging processes. Even if we would have reliable biomarkers of age (such as the aspartate racimization in the teeth used in forensics), this would not allow us to explain aging, nor would it even be helpful in predicting an increasing risk of death or any other type of biological failure.
If aging would develop in synchrony with chronological time, the differently marked ages would have to be included in a continuum, as subsequent phases that demonstrate a structured development away from a state of adult “health” or “normality.” It is doubtful whether all biological processes can be adequately seen as continuous functional deterioration; some may suddenly deteriorate or collapse. Moreover, human aging appears to imply many distinct but interrelated processes that are relatively independent but still interact with other processes in the same body (Kirkwood et al., 2006). The many different processes of aging may have their specific dynamic properties, but these are usually affected by the environments inside and outside the human body (e.g., ecological or social contexts and personal lifestyles). This explains their intrinsic malleability (Kirkwood, 2005; Westendorp and Kirkwood, 2007), which is seen in the large differences in life expectancy and health that we can observe when we compare several historical and contemporary countries or regions with each other.
How important such contexts are can be gathered from the enormous change in life expectancies that has taken place in the rich countries during the last 150 years (Oeppen and Vaupel, 2002), which still awaits explanation. A major shift or mutation in the evolutionary substrate of human life seems not very likely. Seen from this perspective, our bodies basically have not changed since the ancient Greeks, let alone since the nineteenth century. All this defies the possibility that chronological age could by itself give any explanation of aging processes.
 
The Age-Period-Cohort Problem as Epistemological Riddle
We cannot study the processes of aging as we would study other processes, because we cannot isolate “aging” in an experimental group and compare the results with a control group that does not age. Moreover, all aging takes place in specific contexts that co-constitute its outcomes. This fundamental human condition haunts even the most sophisticated research strategies (cf. Baars, 2007b; Schaie, 2007). The notorious age-period-cohort problem confronts us with the question of what we have established when we have found, for instance, that a high percentage of a group of 70-year-olds has obesity. Is this because of their age? Is it part of their specific “cohort identity”? Is it because they lived for a certain period of years in a culture of fast junk food? Is it “a little bit of all that”? Human aging cannot be studied in a pure form: even a scientifically controlled life in a laboratory would be a life in a specific context that would co-constitute the processes that would take place.
The search for general aging characteristics based on chronological age has produced much counterevidence, testifying to the many differences in aging processes. This counterevidence hardly comes as a surprise when we try to imagine people with the same chronological age but living in very different circumstances. Think, for instance, of “60-year-olds”: one would expect major differences in many important respects among, say, a contemporary poor Russian farmer, a wealthy Japanese person, and a homeless American of that age--not to mention 60-year-olds in ancient Egypt, in classical China, or among nineteenth-century factory workers.
Approaches to aging in terms of chronological age are likely to result in establishing many differences in aging processes among people with the same age. Therefore, they should not (implicitly) be used to explain aging processes without a further gerontological clarification. Problems resulting from an unreflective overemphasis on chronological age are likely to occur, as the concept of chronological time has been institutionalized to measure and coordinate processes and actions in modern societies. This leads also to the idea that societal processes can be optimally organized on the basis of the ages of the people concerned. In turn, this can easily lead to self-fulfilling prophecies: if in a given society the dominant agents in the labor market are under the impression that productivity is declining after the age of 50, this will most likely become true, not because this is inherent in their aging process, but as an artifact of the “chronological regimes” (Baars, in press) that define these people as “older workers.”
Confronted with the enormous quantity of empirical data gathered in the last decade that demonstrate the differences among “the aged,” Settersten (2005, 2006) has given an overview of what gerontologists say makes “old people” different from other adults: losses in physical and cognitive capacities; increased likelihood of failing health and a centrality of health concerns in self-definitions; shorter time horizon and a more pressing need to come to terms with one’s mortality; personal loss, bereavement, and more restricted social networks; being perceived and treated by others in agist ways; and a greater acceptance of things that cannot be controlled in life, coupled with a greater fear of losing control over one’s life.
These important issues for adult aging show how limited the concept of chronological age is. It is always possible to establish averages, but losses in physical and cognitive capacities, failing health, and bereavement are not evenly distributed according to chronological age but are in an essentially uncertain way part of finite human lives. There may be different forms of “increased likelihood,” for instance, according to the socioeconomic contexts of the people concerned, but these demonstrate once more that chronological age cannot give an explanation of the processes involved. Moreover, we can see in the problem of agism (Gullette, 2004) how problematic generalizations about people above a certain age can be. Finally, themes such as “a shorter time horizon” and “mortality” presuppose a more personal involvement in temporal living than can be understood from chronological time.

Part II. Aging and Experiences of Living in Time
Statistical overviews and average estimates on the basis of chronological time may be needed for planning purposes, but they cannot satisfy the need to understand the passage of time in one’s personal life. From philosophy we can derive three approaches to (living in) time that allow for more elaboration of personal experiences. A first has been initially developed by the fifth-century theologian Augustine and had a major influence on such contemporary philosophers as Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty (cf. Ricoeur, 1988; Baars, 2007a). This approach offers opportunities to understand that we experience a present, in which we read a text, speak with somebody, or listen to music. Such an experience of the present gets completely lost in the blur of rapidly rolling digital numbers; moreover, although the duration of each event or experience could be measured, such measurements are completely irrelevant for the intensity of the experience or the way it may be unforgettable and life changing. 
One’s experience of the present is inherently connected with a remembrance of the past and an anticipation of the future. Hence, something that happened “a long time ago” (from a chronological perspective) can be vividly experienced in the present and remembered as if it happened yesterday, whereas something (for instance, a personal relationship) that was important a year ago can be experienced as taking place in the distant past. Experiences of the past, present, and future do not follow the orderly arrangements of chronological time even though we have, a posteriori, the possibility to locate or date the situations and experiences in chronological time.
Memory as presence of the past does not just comprise what or how we want to remember. We only evoke a part of our memories consciously; a much greater part evokes us or keeps troubling us just when we would like to forget. In this context, Hannah Arendt (1958) referred not only to memory but also to forgiveness as a typically interhuman characteristic. Resentment or bitterness can be a destructive form of what Augustine called the presence of the past in which painful events remain as vivid as if they took place only recently and no time seems to have passed since. Ultimately, nonforgiving obstructs one’s openness to the present and to the future so that the past cannot be a source of inspiration for the future. 
We may be able to understand our life backward, but we must, as Kierkegaard (1987) remarked, live life forward and are inevitably confronted with uncertainty about the future--an uncertainty that opens, however, the opportunity to live one’s life. That there are nowadays no generally accepted structures of meaning in aging can be seen as a loss, but the obligation to follow fixed patterns or phases of life might weigh heavily and frustrate creativity. The awareness that our confrontations with the contingencies of life are not based on unquestioned structures of meaning makes life more insecure but also potentially richer. We may not know how to live with fundamental uncertainty, but we cannot live well without it either.
A second temporal concept is even older than Augustine’s pathbreaking work and can already be found in Hesiod (2006). The idea of kairos--that the present offers or denies a particular opportunity--plays an important role in early Greek Pythagorean philosophy and in Stoic thought: this idea has clearly pragmatic origins in experiences of sailing, fishing, and agriculture. For the Stoics it was important to live according to what opportunities were given () or denied () by the gods or the course of nature. This concept of time is still presupposed when we are thinking about when the “time is ripe” to do or say something and when not. We know this from everyday expressions such as “If you want to do it, do it now”; “It’s now or never”; or “Now is not the right time.” This has in the past often been interpreted in relation to life’s phases or seasons, but it can also be applied to important situations in life. In all these cases, kairos, the eminent moment, is not regulated by chronological time. 
A third temporal concept is that of narrative, the arrangement of chronologically separated events in time into a coherent story. One of the remarkable aspects of narrative is its ability to integrate in a loose but potentially meaningful way the most diverse events, actions, and their evaluations. According to Ricoeur, a central role in composing loosely integrative configurations is played by the act of emplotment. In creating a plot, unrelated incidents are integrated into a meaningful whole, making them part of a story that contains a beginning, middle, and end.
Through the plot, events and story are connected reciprocally so that the story changes when other events or interpretations are introduced and vice versa. This implies that the “same” events can be integrated into different stories, where the elements are arranged differently, with other emphases or from other points of view. Such differences are not due to a lack of precision, as it may appear from the point of view of methodically controlled intersubjectivity. Different stories may express other experiences, other evaluations, or different points of view precisely. Another important achievement of emplotment is the integration of the configurational dimension of the narrative (where the emphasis falls on the meaningful pattern) with its chronological dimension (where the emphasis falls on the timing and succession of events). In this context a reference should be made to Paul Ricoeur’s Time and Narrative, in which the hermeneutical circle is fruitfully applied to an unfolding understanding of lived time in prefiguration, configuration, and refiguration of time (Ricoeur, 1988).

Part III. Aging and the Reinterpretation of Finitude
As said earlier, much thought has been given to death in different traditions, whereas aging has been relatively neglected. Now that mortality has been substantially reduced in childhood, adolescence, and much of adulthood, death occurs much more commonly in older individuals. In a culture that tends to be dominated by idols of dynamic life, success, and invulnerability, this has led to a continued neglect of aging and a tendency to approach it as an unimportant residue of life. The growing numbers of “aged” people and the sheer quantity of years that can be spent in “aging” already make it understandable that such an exclusion from the most central domains of society, merely because of the attainment of a certain age, will provoke massive resistance. Not only gerontological programs of “successful aging” but also a more informal culture of “staying young” have been among the one-sided answers to this one-sided vision of aging. The finitude of human life contradicts such superficial answers, but it also deserves to be reinterpreted with regard to aging (cf. Baars, 1997a). 
First of all, finitude in the sense of an awareness of one’s mortality does not have to lead to a vision of aging as a residue of life that is of little importance. On the contrary, the awareness of finitude relativizes cultural idols and poses the question of what our life (as a “whole”) is really about. This fundamental questioning has been part of our cultural traditions but has been radically elaborated by philosophers such as Martin Heidegger (1996). Especially in his early work Being and Time, he presents a fascinating attempt to break away from the modern Cartesian emphasis on the rational subject who is confronted with the world outside of him as his object. Heidegger does break with the rationalism of this tradition by emphasizing the fundamental meaning of the human temporal existence (Da-sein), which can be found in open confrontation with one’s inevitable death. But he also continues the monological orientation of modern rationalism and its individualistic bias.
The importance of an awareness of finitude in the sense of mortality cannot be denied, yet I am not convinced that Heidegger’s isolated heroism in the confrontation with one’s inevitable personal death offers the most important perspective in life, as he maintains. The Angst of death is supposed to “disclose Da-sein as being-possible,” but this would also “individualize and thus disclose Da-sein as ‘solus ipse’” (a “solipsistic self”) (Heidegger, 1996, pp. 176, 188). Other people enter this solipsist universe only as temptations to deviate from this authentic Da-sein. Although this is presented as being-in-the-world, this world is narrowed down to “individualized, pure, thrown potentiality for being” (p. 176, Heidegger’s italics). Heidegger’s view leaves us with two unresolved problems. 
First, facing death includes the lives of others who tend to be regarded by Heidegger as anonymous representatives of inauthenticity (They), a criticism that has been articulated by thinkers such as Levinas (1969, 1987; cf. Baars, 2007a). Finitude should not, as has traditionally been the case, be seen as an aspect of the human condition, but as a quality of the interhuman condition (cf. Baars, 2002).
Second, the tendency to identify finitude with mortality indicates that the finitude throughout human life, its finitude as such is not sufficiently acknowledged. Finitude also applies to the particular qualities and limitations of individuals, to relationships with others, to specific situations in life and their irrevocably transitory uniqueness. The wish to ignore this fundamental quality leads to an abstract image of a world that revolves around success, perfection, infinite youth, and innovation, in which, so it seems, failing, decay, and vulnerability do not occur. Not only does such a culture exclude the “aged,” the disabled, or mentally disabled young people, as well as the sick and the weak, but also it creates stressful and superficial environments for young healthy people who must try to keep up with these idols.
 
Finitude and the Constitution of Meaning
An early text of Homer arouses again our attention. In her book The Fragility of Goodness, Martha Nussbaum (1986) refers to Odysseus’s passionate embrace of finite, mortal life at the very moment that he is offered not only a pleasant life but also immortality by the goddess Calypso. In Homer’s Odyssey, Odysseus is faced with a far-reaching choice: either he will share his life with the wonderful goddess Calypso and will not die, or he will have to leave her island and may have to fight for his life in order to return home to Ithaca. Odysseus, however, informs Calypso that he chooses mortal life, although he does not look forward to all the dangers he may have to face. However, so he emphasizes, he wants to return home, to his wife Penelope, although she is mortal and not as perfect as Calypso, who has “immortality and unfading youth.” Odysseus trusts his “heart that is inured to suffering” (Homer, 1991, p. 76), which helped him endure the hardships of the past. And so he trusts that he will endure what is to come. He does not aspire to live forever, even when he has the choice in this magical narrative, but wants to live with other human mortals.
This episode presents an interesting contrast with the many stories about paradises where eternal life was lost in punishment of sinful behavior. Homer lets Odysseus make a positive choice for a finite and vulnerable life, a profound choice with far-reaching implications. If everything could always be postponed, nothing would matter. Simone de Beauvoir articulated a similar vision in her novel All Men Are Mortal (1992), in which the person who became immortal loses all meaningful understanding of finite living in human worlds. Only in a finite life can something be at stake.

Facing Limit Situations
One way to approach the finitude of human life in a broader sense is through the example of “limit situations” (Grenzsituationen) (Jaspers, 1971; Blattner, 1994) such as, indeed, death, but also depression, sorrow, disease, and suffering, and not only one’s own but also of beloved others. These situations are not connected with chronological age but with human life as such: even a young child may become seriously ill or lose a parent or a friend. Loss, suffering, and death are inherent to human life; we can try to avoid or postpone them, but we cannot eradicate them from our lives. In this sense we cannot change these limit situations, but they will change us. As Jaspers emphasizes, the way we should confront them is not through planning and calculation, but through becoming ourselves in surrendering acceptance. However, as in Heidegger’s resolute confrontation with death, there is an almost heroic tendency, a melancholic counterpart to “successful aging”--to idealize suffering as if this would be the only way to live authentically. When one could become oneself in confrontation with the limit situations, as Jaspers maintains, the question arises whether the person who becomes “oneself” did not have a self before that. It appears to be important to acknowledge the dignity of suffering, but also to say that if we are not suffering that much, this does not mean that we fail to lead a fully human life.
There are, however, still good reasons to heed the finitude of the interhuman condition as the highly cultivated ability of the Western world to cure disease, create safer environments, and postpone dying has created the illusion that people suffer or die because the efforts to help them have failed. This may be occasionally true, but eventually there are limitations inherent to human life. The highly specialized and often effective technology tends to occlude the fundamental character of the interhuman condition and create the illusion that people are dying because medical technology has not yet found the means to cure the diseases they are dying from (cf. Hayflick and Moody, 2002).

Aging as a Radicalization of Human Vulnerability
“Aging” people have no monopoly on human vulnerability, and their lives should not be considered as the opposite of the “invulnerable” lives of “normal” adults, which could be put under great stress without any negative effects. Still, as we saw earlier, a persistent theme through the ages has been the decline and loss of all human qualities: failing organs, brittle bones, and stiffening muscles, but also an increasing risk that beloved others may die. In other words, the vulnerability inherent in human life radicalizes as people get older. 
The other important theme has been that inherent to human aging is a deeper meaning that will present itself or that has to be discovered during its process (Cole, 1992; Randall, 1997; Randall and Kenyon, 2000). Not only are healthy aging people capable of a continuing growth in experience and competence in the specific activities and fields they are interested in, especially when they find that their competences are acknowledged, but also they develop--even when they are chronically ill or disabled--important skills when dealing daily with problems and restrictions facing them. But on another, more existential level, a growing depth in experience and vision of aging people may be intimately connected with an increasing vulnerability, although this will not be the automatic result of “a higher age,” “the passing of time,” or the “seasons of life.” By itself, a confrontation with limit situations does not give a deepening of understanding. This presupposes attention to and “working through” the crucial moments of life in which its hidden meaning may be discovered (Kierkegaard, 1987; Birren and Deutchman, 1991; Birren and Cochran, 2001). The meaning of human aging may be found in a radicalization of the vulnerability of unique human life, which is not the monopoly of “aged” people, but inherent to the interhuman condition.
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